OF MAD DOGS AND SCIENTISTS:
THE PERILS OF THE "CRIMINAL-INSANE"
ROBERT A. BURTt

Chief Judge David L. Bazelon has stood at the meeting
point of psychiatry and the criminal law during the past twentyfive years. The hopes and happy promises, the disappointments
and recriminations of that uneasy conjunction are vividly refracted in his judicial career. DurhamI is the first large landmark.
The explicit intent of that opinion was to permit psychiatrists to
explain antisocial conduct in the language of their discipline,
unencumbered by competing conceptual constructs drawn, for
example, from quasi-religious explanations of "bad behavior."
But there was a larger purpose behind this strategy. Durham solicited psychodynamic explanations of criminal conduct because
these seemed to offer hopeful directions for a more constructive, humane social response to criminal deviancy. Psychiatrists
would offer not only their explanations but, more importantly,
their prescriptions for cure in the dramatic liturgy of the criminal trial. The public would be seized by these performances
and persuaded to commit the resources needed to meet these
prescriptions.
The script has not gone that way. For a time, Judge Bazelon's opinions seemed to blame the actors in the drama-the
trial courts, attorneys, and most pointedly the psychiatric witnesses-for failing to understand and to communicate intellig2
ibly the best psychodynamic theories about antisocial conduct.
But the true villain of the piece appears center stage twelve
years after Durham in the "right to treatment" case, Rouse v.
t Professor of Law and Professor of Law in Psychiatry, University of Michigan. A.B.
1960, Princeton University; M.A. 1962, Oxford University; J.D. 1964, Yale University.
Law Clerk to Chief Judge Bazelon, 1964-65.
Copyright 1974 C by Robert A. Burt.
I Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
2 See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444
(D.C. Cir. 1967); Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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Cameron.3 Charles Rouse had been found not guilty of a criminal offense by reason of insanity, under the Durham formulation, and confined in a public mental institution for several
years. Where, Judge Bazelon asked, was even the semblance of
treatment resources for Rouse that the psychiatrists had appeared to promise?
This year, twenty years after Durham, in a significant lecture
at the annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association,
Judge Bazelon concluded that the "Durham experiment" had
been a "failure."' 4 This is an accurate appraisal only in one sense:
the initial hopes that psychiatric insights would lead to fundamental improvements in the criminal justice system have not
been realized. But in another sense Durham has not failed. An
experiment succeeds not only by proving the experimenter's initial hypothesis. The Durham experiment has succeeded by
graphically demonstrating a proposition of considerable social
importance: the conjoining of psychiatry and the criminal law
frequently (perhaps inevitably) produces mutual misunderstandings and defeats optimistic expectations on all sides.
This lesson is critically important for evaluating current
claims both to promote and to oppose development of new technologies for the control of antisocial conduct. Current popular
belief sees frightening, mounting waves of crime and, even
worse, crime justified in a new, more terrifying way. From the
Attica uprising to terrorist kidnappings by self-styled "liberation
armies," violent criminal activity is increasingly depicted as political struggle between warring classes. This politicization of crime,
and its concomitant celebration of vengeful domestic violence, is
now characteristic of both the forces of "order" and the forces of
"disorder," of both the police forces and the anti-police forces.
The stage is thus set for a new drama. On the one side are
the technological hucksters, eagerly joined by some political
leaders and correctional administrators. In response to the claim
that violence is legitimate political protest, it is obviously much
more comfortable, much more conscience appeasing, to characterize this violence as merely symptomatic of illness or specifically of diseased brains. This is a thesis offered by prominent
3373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Cf. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 7 (1967).
4 Address by Chief Judge Bazelon, "The Perils of Wizardry," Annual Meeting of the
American Psychiatric Association, Detroit, Michigan, May 7, 1974, at 9-12 (typescript)
[hereinafter cited as "Wizardry"].
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proponents of psychosurgery.5 From the other side, we can expect fervid denunciations of all science, of all attempts at systematic understanding and amelioration of socially deviant violence. The grandiosity of the technological hucksters, and the
transparently unpleasant motives of their main social allies, will
give plausibility to this Luddite response.
In his lecture to the American Psychiatric Association, Judge
Bazelon spoke of this newly touted behavioral technology:
In the 1930's and 1940's atomic scientists stood on
the threshold of unlocking the secrets of the atom,
ushering in the nuclear era. Today, the biobehavioral
scientist stands on the threshold
of unlocking many of
6
the secrets of the brain.
This comparison aptly evokes the question whether we can reap
the benefits promised by this new technology without being
overwhelmed by the destructive forces it places in our hands.
The Durham experiment offers some guidance. Durham is,
first of all, a paradigm of a traditional American response to
criminal deviance: the conjunction of the policeman and the
medicine man. But more than that, Durham provides a very special meeting ground for these professions-the highly visible,
reified social and medical status of "criminal-insane." This status
is not restricted in our jurisprudence to the insanity defense
alone. Specialized social response to the "criminal-insane" is
mandated for criminal defendants found incompetent to stand
trial,7 for sexual offenders found to be "criminal sexual psychopaths," 8 for offenders found to be "defective delinquents,"9
for persons civilly committed because of "mental illness and
dangerousness to others,"'10 and for prisoners found "mentally
ill" during their criminal sentence terms." I believe that these
"criminal-insane" statuses provide precisely the worst, most socially harmful model for collaboration between the criminal law
and psychiatry (and the behavioral technologies generally). It is
the central thesis of this Article that the rigid delineations between persons in these statuses and the general criminal popu5 For a critical discussion, see E. VALENSTEIN, BRAIN CONTROL 248-63 (1973).
6 "Wizardry," supra note 4, at 1.

See text accompanying notes 49-67 infra.

8 See text accompanying notes 87-93 infra.

9See id.
oSee text accompanying notes 69-75 infra.
"ISee text accompanying notes 94-96 infra.
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lation must be abolished to help forestall easy social acceptance
of the worst abuses of the new correctional biotechnology, and
to help preserve the possibility of sensible future collaboration
between behavioral sciences and the criminal law.
I.

RETAINING OR ABOLISHING THE

"CRIMINAL-INSANE" STATUSES: WHOSE BURDEN?

I have argued elsewhere that novel biotechnologies which
patently threaten basic concepts of human dignity, such as
psychosurgery or implantation of monitoring electrodes in the
brain, should not be used in the correctional setting until they
are wholly perfected and widely accepted for use in the free
community. 12 But, whatever the merits of that argument, not all
of the new biotechnology is so obviously offensive, and even for
such techniques as aversive conditioning (for example, electric
shocks psychologically linked to perverse sexual desires) the new
technology often becomes quickly faddish and thus apparently
no longer "experimental."' 13 If there is a need to protect prisoners, and the correctional system, from inappropriate uses of behavioral technology, those protections must reach beyond such
clear problems as experimental psychosurgery.
There is such need. Charles Rouse exemplifies one aspect
of that need. He came to the attention of the criminal justice
system with a misdemeanor charge of carrying a dangerous
weapon. The maximum possible prison term on this charge
was one year. But Rouse's attorney, inspired by Durham, brought
the psychodynamic roots of his client's conduct to the court's
attention.' 4 Consequently Rouse spent some five years confined
in a public mental institution which he, at least, judged to have
given him nothing. Rouse's plight is not unique. The systematic
empirical research available in current literature has uniformly
found that those persons caught in the "criminal-insane" statuses
are as a rule confined for longer terms than comparable persons
5
who are socially labelled either "criminal" or "insane" alone.'
12

Burt, Why Keep Prisonersfrom the Doctors: Reflections on the Detroit Psychosurgery Trial,

3 HASTINGS CENTER STUDIES, No. I (forthcoming).
" See, e.g., R. SCHWITZGEBEL, DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL REGULATION OF COERCIVE
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES WITH OFFENDERS 8-15 (National Institute of Men-

tal Health, Public Health Service Pub. No. 2067, 1971).
14 See Rouse v. Cameron, 387 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
15See, e.g., H. STEADMAN & J. COCOZZA,CAREERS OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE (publication forthcoming); McGarry, The Fate of Psychotic Offenders Referred for Trial, 127 AM. J.
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This documented experience reflects the common sense of
the matter. Both the "criminal" and the "insane" depictions present a frightening visage. The two together must necessarily add
terror to each. In the public's view these two are at least the sum
of their parts, if not more. But this might not be wrong: if in fact
the longer confinements of the "criminal-insane" reflected that
they were more dangerous than persons carrying either depiction alone, it would be hard to quarrel with such confinement.
In the available research literature, this proposition cannot
be conclusively documented one way or the other. There is,
however, good reason to suspect, as a general matter, that the
''criminal-insane" population is not much different from the
other confined populations and that application of those labels
reflects more bad luck than reliably bad prognosis for its recipients. The basis for this suspicion is two-fold. First, the doctrines used to sort out the "criminal-insane"r-the insanity defense, "sexual psychopathy," incompetency to stand trial, and the
like-both in their conceptual roots and in their practical applications offer only haphazard demarcations against ordinary
criminal or mental illness standards. 16 Second, those researchers
who have systematically searched for reliable indicia of future
dangerousness among any of these designated populations
-criminal, insane, or "criminal-insane"-have found that substantial overprediction was necessary to identify any significant
number of persons who would in fact subsequently .act
dangerously.' 7 This literature does not, of course, establish that
there are no further refinements possible among these groups,
but the task has not yet been accomplished.
Thus, on the basis of the best current data, we can confidently say only that there is reason to suspect that the "criminalinsane" as a group are no more dangerous than other confined
populations. But without clear proof this suspicion is not a sufficient basis for proposing abolition of the "criminal-insane"
statuses, because there is also reason to suspect the opposite-PSYCHIAT. 1181 (1971); McGarry & Bendt, Criminalvs. Civil Commitment of Psychotic Offenders: A Seven-Year Follow-up, 125 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 1387 (1969). Cf. A. MATTHEWS,
MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 138 (1970).
16See, e.g., S. BRAKEL & R. RocK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 358 (rev.
ed. 1971); A. MATTHEWS, supra note 15, at 85-87; Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous
Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 514 (1968).

17 See Morris, supra note 16, at 529-36; Rubin, Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally
Ill Criminals, 27 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 397 (1972); Wenk, Robison & Smith, Can Violence
be Predicted?, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 393 (1972).
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that the "criminal-insane" are very different indeed from these
other groups. The basis for this opposite suspicion is grounded
in popular perceptions of the hard core cases in each group.
The "criminal": a calculating man who attacks for gain and who,
accordingly, can be persuaded by social sanctions that "crime
does not pay." The "insane": a senile and eccentric madman
blithely remote from our common world who threatens only his
own well-being. Finally, the "criminal-insane": a violent madman who cannot rationally be dissuaded from his conduct by
application of sanctions, and whose consequent unpredictability
is a constant, erratically terrifying threat to our sense of communal order.
Such hard core cases can be found in each of these populations. The central question for social policy is whether the existence of these hard core cases adequately justifies continued institutional adherence to the elaborate trappings of separate
categorizations. The answer to this policy question might depend
on head counts, determining whether the hard core and thus
reliably "different" cases were more or less sufficiently prevalent
among these different groups. The absence of conclusive data
only poses a further question: should the categorizations continue to exist without conclusive data justifying rejection of or
adherence to them? Because of the shortcomings of available
data, either retaining or abolishing the "criminal-insane" statuses
must depend in large part on an act of faith. Thus to answer this
further question we must turn to some species of social theology
and ask whether important values are more threatened than
advanced by adherence to the "criminal-insane" statuses.
Let me approach this question anecdotally first, drawing
from the experience of the Detroit psychosurgery trial last
year. 18 This litigation was initiated in response to an experiment
under way at the Lafayette Clinic in Detroit to perform
psychosurgery on a group of purportedly dangerous confined
persons. Only one subject had been selected when the litigation
was filed. That subject, known at trial as John Doe, had been
confined in the state maximum security mental institution for
eighteen years. In 1955, he had allegedly confessed to a brutal
rape-murder and, as -an alternative to criminal trial, he was
found by the court to be a "criminal sexual psychopath" under
18Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 2 PRISON L. REP. 433 (Mich. Cir. Ct.,
Wayne County, 1973).
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the specially designated Michigan statute. 19 In the course of the
psychosurgery trial, considerable doubts were raised about
whether John Doe was reliably different, even by any generally
applied psychiatric diagnostic criteria, from a broad range of
alleged or convicted murderers in the ordinary prison
population.20 These doubts pointed to another question: how
did it happen that John Doe, in particular, was chosen as a
potential experimental subject from all of the apparently
dangerous people in Michigan institutions? The answer to this
question was clear from the initial research protocol. The experimenter intended to perform psychosurgery only on persons
who were confined as "criminal sexual psychopaths." However
much these few persons might overlap in psychological and social characteristics with others in Michigan institutions, the "criminal sexual psychopath" label singularly attracted the experimenter's attention.
John Doe testified during the psychosurgery trial. In exploring how he was selected for the experiment, Doe was asked to
describe his "feelings about" the conditions of his confinement.
He responded:
Well, overall, it is not a very good attitude. I must
truthfully say that. The hospital was set up for detention, and as far as I am concerned, the attitude and the
policies toward patients when I first went there were
very nil. I have the feeling that when I was put there
that it was just nothing but for detention and to get rid
of me and, well, a place to stay. And this is the way it
has been over the years. Of course, I have never been
mistreated really physically, but the emotional treathas
ment has been like-as far as I am concerned-it
21
been like a dog in a pen. And that is about it.
John Doe's view that he had been treated "like a dog in a
pen" is not uniquely ascribable to his status as a "criminal sexual
psychopath." This society in significant ways treats all prisoners,
confined under whatever rubric, as "animals." We keep them in
'9 No. 165, [1939] Mich. Acts 323 (repealed 1968). Continued detention for those
previously held as criminal sexual psychopaths under the repealed statute was authorized
by MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 330.35(b) (Supp. 1974).
20 See testimony of Dr. Andrew S. Watson, Trial Transcript, Apr. 4, 1973, passim,
Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 2 PRISON L. REP. 433 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne
County, 1973).
21Testimony of John Doe, id. 5.
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cages, after all. But there is a special social danger that comes
from confinement of persons in highly visible, medical-sounding
"criminal-insane" statuses. This danger can be seen between the
lines of a statement by B. F. Skinner, one of the most prominent
apostles of novel uses of biotechnology for social control. Skinner has responded to the charge that the new biotechnology
treats "the man who survives as a mere animal" in this way:
"Animal" [he says] is a pejorative term, but only because
"man" has been made spuriously honorific. [Some people have] argued that whereas the traditional view supports Hamlet's exclamation, "How like a god!," Pavlov,
the behavioral scientist, emphasized "How like a dog!"
But that was a step forward. A god is the archetypal
pattern of an explanatory fiction, of a miracle-working
mind, of the metaphysical. Man is much more than a
dog, but like a dog he is within range of a scientific
22
analysis.
This cool view of man fits comfortably within well-accepted,
socially beneficial scientific traditions. The proposition that man
for some purposes may be viewed as an animal, like any other,
or as a mechanistic assemblage of working organs, is the central
tenet of biological understanding and therapies for the diseases
of man. Unless we are able to conceptualize man as something
other than unique and inviolable, unless we are able to see him
as also an ordinary animal or a machine it is impossible to think
that a surgeon could ever comfortably plunge a knife into the
supine restrained body facing him from the operating table. But
even in ordinary medical practice, considerable tension is generated by the technological imperative that "dehumanizes" in some
degree, however fleetingly, however denied, human beings who
are patients. Daniel Callahan has aptly identified this "dilemma,
which is at once psychological, ethical and sociological...":
How can we manage both to live humanely with . . .
disease and yet to conquer it at the same time? Both
goals seem imperative and yet the logic of each is different. We cure disease by ceasing to romanticize it, by
gathering our powers to attack it, by making it an
enemy to be conquered. We learn to live with a disease,
however, in a very different way: by trying to accept
22
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and cherish those who manifest it, by shaping social
structures and institutions which will soften the individual suffering brought on by the disease, by refusing
to make the bearer23 of the disease our economic, social
or political enemy.
As difficult as this dilemma is to manage in ordinary medical
practice, its difficulty is staggeringly compounded in scientific
pursuits with captive populations. When this society saw John
Doe, and when he saw himself, as a "dog in a pen," none of us
had in mind Skinner's carefully calibrated scientific view. If we
join these different definitions together, ineluctably and uncontrollably they redefine, distort, and magnify one another. When
the medicine man and the policeman join forces to devise means
for combatting violence, they are together offering to define the
violent criminal for us as a wild animal, a "mad dog." When our
social institutions give special weight, prior legitimation, and
routinized operation to this social and medical view, those institutions weaken the already tenuous constraints that keep us
from imposing horrifying inflictions on those we fear and would
conquer.
The special danger of the "criminal-insane" statuses is that
they give a visible patina of science to a particular group, thus
producing candidates for technologies that we otherwise might
not dare to practice on anyone. Current fervid social debate
about "the true nature" of convicted criminals generally-are
they political prisoners, bad men, sick men, or some or all of
these?-keeps this population in a more protected status of indeterminacy. But for the labelled, prepackaged groups of the
"criminal-insane," technological targeting is that much easier.
Some recent social science experiments provide chilling data
on this score. Stanley Milgram, a psychologist at Yale University,
designed an ingenious set of experiments to test obedience to
authority that commands infliction of considerable pain on
others. 24 Milgram's subjects were drawn from a cross-section of
the New Haven and Bridgeport, Connecticut, populations by
newspaper advertisements and telephone solicitation, asking that
they participate in experiments to test the effect of punishment
on learning. Upon arriving at the laboratory, the subjects were
23 D. CALLAHAN, THE TYRANNY OF SURVIVAL 230 (1973).
24 S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974).
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met by a gray-coated technician and another apparent subject
(who was in fact a trained actor). By rigged drawing of lots, the
subjects were chosen as "teachers" and the actor chosen as
"learner." The "learner" was then strapped in a chair, and the
"teacher" was instructed by the experimenter to give memory
tests to the learner and to administer electric shocks of increasing severity for each wrong answer. The teacher-subject administered the shocks by depressing different levers on an instrument
panel before him; the levers had thirty gradations designated
from 15 to 450 volts, and these voltage designations were
grouped together under labels ranging from "slight shock" at 15
volts, "extreme intensity shock" at 255 volts, "danger: severe
''25
shock" at 375 volts, and at 435 volts only an artful "XXX.
During the entire sequence, the "learner" was in fact not
shocked at all, though the teacher-subject's belief that he was
actually administering very painful shocks was reinforced in a
number of ways, including the administration to the subject himself of a jarring 75 volt shock from this apparatus at the beginning of the experiment. The "learner-victim" responded to the
subject's acts in depressing the shock levers in this way:
[T]he victim indicated no discomfort until the
75-volt shock was administered, at which time there was
a little grunt. ...[A]t 120 volts the victim shouted to the
experimenter that the shocks were becoming painful.
Painful groans were heard on administration of the
135-volt shock, and at the 150 volts the victim cried out,
"Experimenter, get me out of here! I won't be in the
experiment any more! I refuse to go on!" Cries of this
type continue with generally rising intensity, so that at
180 volts the victim cried out, "I can't stand the pain,"
and by 270 volts his response to the shock was definitely
an agonized scream. Throughout, from 150 volts on, he
insisted that he be let out of the experiment. At 300
volts the victim shouted in desperation that he would no
longer provide answers to the memory test.2 6
Whenever the teacher-subject turned questioningly to the
laboratory technician during this sequence, the experimentertechnician would direct him to continue the memory test and the
25

Id. 13-31.
261Id.23.
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escalating electric shocks. The experimenter's direction followed
this regular sequence, as described by Milgram:
Prod 1:
Prod 2:
Prod 3:
Prod 4:

Please continue, or, Please go on.
The experiment requires that you continue.
It is absolutely essential that you continue.2 7
You have no other choice, you must go on.

If the teacher-subject asked whether the learner-victim was being
harmed by the shocks, the experimenter-technician would respond, "Although the shocks may be painful, there is no permanent tissue damage, so please go on. (Followed by Prods 2, 3,
28
and 4, if necessary.)"
The purpose of the experiment was to see whether and
when the teacher-subject would refuse to continue administering
the shocks. The results were profoundly disturbing. In one variation, with the victim in an adjoining room but clearly audible,
twenty-five of forty teacher-subjects (62.5%) administered the
highest shock levels possible, at the XXX designations, in obedience to the experimenter's direction. With the victim in the same
room, sixteen of forty (40%) escalated the shocks to the highest
limits. With the subject and victim side by side, and the subject
required to press the victim's hand onto a metal plate to administer the shock, twelve of forty (30%) continued through the XXX
level.2 9 In another set of variations, the victim mentioned as he
was being strapped into the chair that he had "a slight heart
condition." When the shock level reached 150 volts, the victim
stated that his heart was "starting to bother" him and he repeated this complaint several times with, finally, an "intense and
prolonged agonized scream" at 330 volts. 30 This variation did
not change the experimental results at all. Milgram concluded,
"Probably there is nothing the victim can say that will uniformly
generate disobedience; for the teacher's actions are not con'3
trolled by him. 1
It is hard to understand fully what did control the teachersubjects' actions. In an obvious sense, of course, the experimenter was in control. But the crucial question is why the
7

2 Id. 21.
28 Id

.

Id. 34-35 (Table 2).
30 Id. 55-57.
31Id. 57.
2
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teacher-subjects were willing to yield control of their actions to
the experimenter and to engage in recklessly cruel conduct toward another human being. The mystique of Science, which
cloaked the experimenter, was likely an important determinant
here. In other variations of this experiment, the subject was left
alone in the laboratory though the experimenter first told him
"he was free to select any shock level on any of the trials. ' 32 In
this variation, twenty-eight of forty "went no higher than the
[learner-victim's] first indication of discomfort, and 38 did not
go beyond the point where the learner vehemently protested
[150 volts]. '3 3 In yet another variation, the gray-coated technician was called away from the laboratory (on a ruse) and authorized the experiment to be conducted by an "ordinary man"
(another actor who appeared to arrive at the laboratory at the
same time as the teacher-subject). In this variation, only four
man's" directives
subjects of twenty (20%) obeyed the "ordinary
34
to administer the maximum possible shocks.
The Milgram experiments suggest a central role to the selfjustifying norms of Science in another, ironic way. The conduct
of the experiments themselves has been sharply attacked on the
ground that Milgram deceived his subjects in multiple ways and
led them unwittingly into an experience which, for the obedient
subjects, brought them "to live with the realization that they were
willing to yield to destructive authority to the point of inflicting
extreme pain on a fellow human being. '3 5 Milgram himself discounted this criticism, describing postexperimental measures to
avoid adverse impact on the subjects and stating that follow-up
studies of his subjects revealed no psychological harm. He suggested, at least by implication, that the absence of adverse impact
36
on the subjects is itself an intriguing finding of the experiment.
Milgram may be correct in these observations, but it is nonetheless clear that he took extraordinary risks with the future emotional well-being of his subjects in these experiments. His vivid
depictions of their stress in administering the shocks is itself
testimony to this. 37 It is further clear that if Milgram had simply
32

Id.71.

33
Id. 72.
34

Id. 94 (Table 4).
35 Kelman, Human Use of Human Subjects: The Problem of Deception inSocial Psychological Experiments, 67 PSYCHOL. BULL 1, 5 (1967). See also EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN
BEINGS 395-406 (J. Katz ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as J. Katz].
36 S. MILGRAM, supra note 24, at 193-202.
37
Id. 44-54, 73-88.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:258

lured people into these practices for his own personal amusement, we would not hesitate to condemn his action as grotesque
sadism. The question is made more complex, and Milgram finds
professional and personal refuge, through the ethos of Science.
The lesson is tautly drawn. That ethos can make victimizers and
victims of any of us.
Casting Science as the villain here should not be misconstrued as an attack on the social worth of scientific thought. It is
vital, as noted earlier, that the surgeon poised with his knife be
able momentarily to "dehumanize" his patient-to see him as a
laboratory animal or a machine-so that he can overlook the
patient's abject fear and intense pain caused by the process of
surgery itself. The surgeon is further assisted by his educated
belief that the procedure will benefit the patient in the long run
and that the patient wants his momentary fears and pain to be
disregarded. But if benevolence may be practiced only when the
practitioner suppresses his own instinctual sympathy with the
immediate suffering of a fellow human being before him, the
psychological preconditions for great and destructive confusions
are created. The victimizers in the Milgram experiments fell victim to these confusions. The commands of Science took life on
their own.
The same dynamic occasionally becomes starkly visible from
within correctional institutions. Consider the experiment which
was carried out in 1967 and 1968 at the California correctional
institution at Vacaville. 3 8 (The State Department of Corrections
calls this institution the California Medical Facility, and describes
it as a "psychiatric treatment facility" 39 for convicted offenders.)
Sixty-four inmates at Vacaville were identified as highly disruptive or so-called "extreme acting-out" individuals. Of these, some
were made experimental subjects and those remaining were
made the control group. Some of the experimental subjects
40
agreed to participate but some were included involuntarily.
Whenever one of the experimental subjects violated an institu38 This experiment is described in Mattocks & Jew, Assessment of an Aversive "Contract"
Program with Extreme Acting-Out Criminal Offenders, in J. Katz, supra note 35, at 1016
[hereinafter cited as Assessment].
39 This depiction appears in A. Mattocks & C. Jew, Assessment of an Aversive "Contract" Program with Extreme Acting-Out Criminal Offenders 2 n.*, n.d. (in a portion not
reprinted in J. Katz, supra note 35).
40 Of the 64, 5 did not consent at all and 18 others volunteered reluctantly, feeling
coerced to do so. Assessment, supra note 38, at 1016.

1974]

THE PERILS OF THE "CRIMINAL-INSANE"

tional disciplinary rule, he was immediately taken to a special
room, placed on a table with a physician and group of nurses
present, and then administered a drug called Anectine for approximately two minutes while hospital staff told him that his
transgression should not be repeated and that each future transgression would result in this same drug treatment. At the end of
the sixteen month experiment, these researchers concluded that
the Anectine research subjects committed fewer subsequent disciplinary infractions compared to the control group, to a statistically significant degree. Thus, they concluded, this treatment
program seems a promising route for further research and im41
plementation in correctional institutions.
What exactly did this drug, Anectine, do that led to such
happy results? In the research document, the administering
physician stated that there was no risk of physical harm from
the drug and that there was "no pain accompanying the procedure ... ."42 The only consequence of the drug, he said, was to
induce complete muscular paralysis, during the two minutes of
its administration, including the complete cessation of breathing. Oxygen was administered to the inmate to assure against
any physical harm, but the inmate himself was unable to breathe
or move in any way. The administering physician may have considered that "no pain" accompanied the procedure, but the
inmates did not like it. According to the research document,
"[s]ixteen likened the experience to dying. Three of these compared it to actual experiences in the past in which they had almost drowned. The majority described it as a terrible, scary, experience ....
The physician's bland assurance that there was
"no pain" echoes the gobbledygook response of Milgram's experimenter to the teacher-subjects' misgivings, that the electric
44
shocks caused "no permanent tissue damage, so please go on.
I have noted the Vacaville researchers' conclusion that after
two years of the experiment, the Anectine subjects followed the
institutional rules more closely than the non-Anectine control
group. But what have we really learned from this about future
directions for correctional policy? There is no reason at all to
believe that these terror induced better-behaving inmates would
"-43

41
42
4

1d. 1016-18.
Id. 1017.

3 Id.

44See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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continue their good behavior if they were released from Vacaville. In fact, extensive research data from many different
sources have virtually proven that there is no reliable correlation
between a person's behavior inside and out of a prison. 45 Thus it
was clear from the beginning of this experiment that its "success"
could only prove that subjecting prisoners to extreme terror
would make them behave better inside the institution-but not
necessarily anywhere else.
Why then was this experiment conducted? Didn't we already
know that placing prisoners inside iron maidens, or stretching
them on racks, or beating them until they felt the pain and
terror of imminent death, that all of these techniques improved
the state of prison discipline? But then all of these techniques
clearly violate the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution. If we assume that the Vacaville researchers and their
administrative superiors were acting in good faith in designing
this experiment, then it must be that their technological trappings blinded them from the fact that the entire project, at least
for its unwilling participants, was obviously and conclusively
barred by the eighth amendment.4 6
It would in fact be comforting to assume that these Vacaville
researchers were acting only on conscious sadistic motives, since
this would make the inhumanity of this experiment less threatening, easier to control, for the future. Willful sadism can be found
in all prison systems but when it is discovered, it can be clearly
seen as such.4 7 The scientific ethos, however, obscures all this,
offers just that much pause for second thought, just that much
plausibility for practices which we would otherwise instinctively
abhor, just that much added distance between potential victims
and victimizers.
As the Milgram experiments show, distance between victim
and victimizer can be a crucial determinant in regulating one's
13 See lectures by Norval Morris, "The Future of Imprisonment," especially, "Prison
as Coerced Cure" 22 & "Rehabilitating the Rehabilitative Ideal" 11-12 (The Cooley Lectures, University of Michigan, 1974); Dean & Duggan, Problems in Parole Prediction: A
HistoricalAnalysis, 15 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 450 (1968); cf. Gottfredson, Assessment and Prediction Methods in Crime and Delinquency, in PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT &
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH

CRIME 171 (1967). But cf. Kaplan & Meyerowitz, Psychological Predictorsof Postinstitutional
Adjustment Among Male Drug Addicts, 20 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 278 (1969).

" See Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
" See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th
Cir. 1971).
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cruelty to the other. Physical proximity was the variable in those
experiments. 48 But distance by conceptual categorization seems
an equally salient determinant. If we can hold fast to the conviction that our potential victims are much like us, even just like us
"but for the grace of God," we diminish the likelihood that we
will tolerate inflictions of the worst horrors on them. The
science-sounding labels of the "criminal-insane" are at war with
this purpose.

II.

APPLYING THE BURDEN FOR BENEFIT OF THE
"CRIMINAL-INSANE"

The discussion thus far does not prove that currently applied "criminal-insane" statuses should be abolished. But the import of that discussion should shift the burden of proof on this
matter to those who would hold fast to such statuses. The proponents of these statuses should identify the particular purposes
served by segregating groups of the "mentally ill" from the general criminal population and demonstrate that these purposes
are sufficiently important to justify the social risks created by
retention of these special segregations. To put the inquiry
somewhat differently, the question is whether it is better to ignore the differences between "hard core cases" of criminals with
and without psychopathology, and to act instead as if all criminals were both "mad " and "bad" in some important degree. The
initial arguments in favor of this course seem powerful. What
can the proponents of continued categorical differentiations
offer in rebuttal? To pursue this question, the discussion must
now proceed category by category.
A. Defendants Found Mentally Incompetent
to Stand Trial
The incompetency to stand trial doctrine presents a
paradigm of the abuses and the roads to reform of the
"criminal-insane" statuses. Norval Morris and I have written at
some length on this, arguing that the incompetency doctrine as
41S. MILGRAM, supra note 24, at 32-36. Optimistic hopes that ensuring proximity
effectively guards against human cruelties must be tempered by recalling, from the
Milgram experiments, that even seated side by side, with the subject required to force the
victim's hand onto the shocking metal plate, thirty percent of the subjects ignored the
victim's agonized cries and proceeded on order to the highest shock levels. Id. 35 (Table
2).
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such should be abolished and that mental incompetency should
no longer be a bar to criminal trial but merely one appropriate
ground for authorizing time-limited trial continuances. 4 9 During
these continuances, we have proposed, the state should provide
therapeutic resources (including in some cases compelled mental
hospitalization) attempting to remedy the defendant's disability
and make him competent for trial. But if these attempts fail (or,
more precisely, if they do not succeed in a very short time),
criminal trial should go forward notwithstanding. It is not necessary to repeat the full argument for this position here. Sketching
the outlines of that argument, however, will indicate the way in
which our proposal to abolish the incompetency doctrine stands
in the broader context of the discussion here.
The central avowed purpose of the incompetency doctrine
has been to assure fair treatment to criminal defendants, on the
quite sensible ground that mentally incapacitated persons may be
unable effectively to defend themselves. 50 If, however, we compare this special dispensation for the mentally disordered criminal defendant with the treatment provided defendants with trial
disabilities unrelated to psychopathology, the necessity for this
"criminal-insane" status becomes suspect. A criminal defendant,
for example, may be equally disabled if his crucial alibi witness
fails to testify. State resources are provided to remedy this disability, in the constitutional guarantee "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in [the defendant's] favor ...."51
But if these resources are insufficient to cure the disability-if,
for example, this crucial witness cannot be located within a rela52
tively short time-the criminal trial goes forward nonetheless.
For persisting mental incapacities, however, criminal trial is
permanently barred under current doctrine.
At first glance, this special treatment of mental disability
might appear more favorable to the defendant. But that is only
at first glance. In virtually every state jurisdiction the criminal
defendant has been indefinitely confined in a state mental institution until the lucky day when his mental incapacity was
"cured" and he was finally eligible for criminal trial on the

11 Burt &

Morris, A Proposalfor the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. CHI. L.

REv. 66 (1972).
50

Id. 75.

5 U.S. CONST.amend. VI.
52 United States v. Harris, 441 F.2d 1333, 1336 (10th Cir. 1971); 3 C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 832, at 338 (1969, Supp. 1973).
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charge which remained outstanding. 5 3 The practical impact of
this solicitude was graphically described in a careful study of the
fate of criminal defendants found incompetent to stand trial in
Massachusetts. The investigators found that "more [incompetent
defendants confined in the state mental institution]54 ... had left
...by dying than by all other avenues combined.
Occasionally the plight of an individual incompetent defendant reached visibility, such as the case of Alfred von Wolfersdorf, an eighty-six-year-old man confined in New York for trial
incompetency for almost twenty years. 5 5 During his confinement, von Wolfersdorf steadfastly maintained his innocence of
the charge. Habeas corpus was sought for this old man with, as
Judge Frankel put it, the "poignantly modest request" 5 6 that he
be transferred from the criminally insane mental institution to a
civil institution. The state attorney general refused to make this
possible by dismissing the outstanding indictment, though he
conceded that the death of "key witnesses... and the passage of
time" made it "highly unlikely that the [defendant] could be
brought to trial" 57 even if he were miraculously made competent. Judge Frankel ordered that the defendant be transferred to
the civil institution, and observed, "Cases like this could encourage the canard that Mr. Bumble was too generous by half when
he suggested that 'the law is a ass.' "58
Or consider Tony Savarese, a criminal defendant in Mas59
sachusetts found, in effect, incompetent to stand trial in 1924.
The following notation was entered in his hospital record in
1936:
He is oriented in all three spheres. Memory is good. No
hallucinations of any kind were elicited. Claims he is
entirely innocent of the crime for which he was arrested. No delusions were determined but there seems
53

Burt & Morris, supra note 49, at 66-67

54 McGarry, supra note 15, at 1181.
55 United States ex rel. von Wolfersdorf v. Johnston, 317 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).

For an analysis of the case by von Wolfersdorf's attorney, see B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF
PSYCHIATRY 63-84 (1972).
56 317 F. Supp. at 67.
57 Id.
58 Id.

59 A complete case study, consisting of substantially every entry in Tony Savarese's
hospital record from 1923 to 1956, appears in J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ,
PSYCHOANALYSIS,

PSYCHIATRY AND LAw 634-50 (1967). "Tony Savarese" is a fictitious

name adopted by the authors to protect the defendant's privacy.
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to be a persecutory trend to his ideas. He is emotionally
very unstable. Has frequent periods of excitement.
Thinks that everybody is against him. ...He is in good
contact with his surrounding
and shows fair insight but
60
his judgment is defective.
Mr. Savarese remained confined for thirty-four years; in 1958
he was permitted to plead nolo contendere to the still outstanding
charge and was placed on two years' probation. 61 This record
raises some question about whose judgment was in fact defective.
It may appear that in the guise of protecting the mentally ill,
the criminal justice system has merely victimized them. But this
indictment may be wrong. There is frequently good reason for
confining persons who have committed criminal offenses, and
their mental disability does not necessarily reduce the urgency or
justice of this course. Both von Wolfersdorf and Savarese had
been accused of murder. Von Wolfersdorf's co-defendant, who
had implicated him in a brutal kidnapping-murder of a young
boy, was no longer available as a witness because the state had
executed him for this offense seventeen years earlier. 62 But the
state, by giving special significance to these defendants' mental
disabilities, was unwilling either to release them or to try them
for the alleged offense and thus comfortably justify their continued confinement. The conflicting motives provoked by the
spectre of mental illness-in simple outline, solicitude and
fear 6 3-appear to have induced state paralysis. No one reaps
advantage from this situation-neither the defendant, obviously,
nor the rest of us who, when forced to confront our actions, are
ashamed and, when permitted to ignore those actions, must
necessarily remain uneasily guilty.
The resolution of these conflicting motives is not to ignore
one for the other, but to keep them both in balanced view. A
defendant's mental incompetency should not be ignored. We
should provide ample resources, as quickly as possible, to assist
the defendant toward full competency. But when this result is
60

Id.638.

61 Id. 648.
62 317 F. Supp. at 67.

63 Cf. Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "InsanityDefense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853, 868
(1963): "[L]argely unconscious feelings of apprehension, awe, and anger toward the
'sick,' particularly if associated with 'criminality,' are hidden by the more acceptable
conscious desire to protect the 'sick from criminal liability.'"
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not quickly achieved and clear advantage from our solicitude to
the disabled defendant cannot be assured, we should then
openly acknowledge our companion motive-that we fear the
possible social dangerousness of this person and we want rigorously to test that issue and respond with equal solicitude for our
64
own safety.
The Supreme Court has recently taken the first step toward
a more rational treatment of incompetent defendants. In Jackson
v. Indiana,6 5 the Court invalidated an indefinite confinement
"until competent" of a permanently incompetent (deaf-mute, severely retarded) defendant, and ruled that any incompetency
commitment must be preceded by proof of "substantial probability" that the defendant will become competent "in the foreseeable future. ' 66 But Jackson did not address the disposition of the
criminal charges against a permanently incompetent defendant.
The likely consequence of this ruling is that criminal defendants
who had previously been indefinitely confined based on a trial
incompetency finding alone will now be civilly committed for
"mental illness" and "dangerousness to others. ' 67 The "criminalinsane" can thus be confined as such by yet another name.
B.

Civil Commitmentfor Danger to Others

Civil commitment for dangerousness may serve, in some
cases, as a substitute for criminal proceedings; in any case it purports to provide a "preventive detention" against criminal acts.
The reform of civil commitment for danger to others is a necessary corollary to implementation of other reforms of the "criminal-insane" status that are proposed in this Article. 68 Current
reform efforts for civil commitment have aimed at two targets:
linking the current open-ended "mental illness" standard with
findings of "dangerousness to self or others" and requiring that
civil commitment proceedings adopt virtually all of the procedural trappings of a criminal trial. 69 But these two targets divert
64 Burt

& Morris, supra note 49, at 79-81.
65406 U.S. 715 (1972).
66
Id. at 738.
67 Burt & Morris, supra note 49, at 70-71.
68 For a discussion of these reforms, see text accompanying notes 81-85 & 102-12
infra.
69See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 94 S. Ct. 713
(1974); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Bell v. Wayne County Gen.
Hosp., Civil Action No. 36384 (E.D. Mich., June 4, 1974).
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attention from the central mark: if civil commitment is to be so
much like a criminal trial, both in its substance and procedure,
why should there be civil commitment at all?
There is one legitimate reason for preserving civil commitment: for short term, emergency interventions to stop an apparently deranged person from inflicting unintended harm on himself or others. A person's destructive conduct toward himself or
others is frequently meant, however unconsciously, as a cry for
help, for constraint, for proof that others care enough to intervene. Civil commitment, properly limited, can thus be an act of
true solicitude. It can be an opportunity for a mentally ill person
to confront the fact of his illness, to understand that he wants to
act and to be better, and to realize that others might help him
toward that goal.7 0 But this solicitude, when linked to indeterminate confinement, is readily transformed into darker motives.
"As the term of a civil commitment lengthens ... its claim to a
therapeutic purpose loses all plausibility. Community protection
becomes its predominant, if not exclusive, purpose, and civil
commitment becomes the functional equivalent of criminal
71
commitment.
Preventive detention, based on some plausible indication of
future dangerous conduct, is not unknown to our criminal law.
Convictions for threats alone of bodily injury, for possession of
firearms or burglar's tools, even for unsuccessful attempts at
crime, are all well-accepted examples.7 2 Many criminologists are
currently advocating that preventive detention be more directly
practiced by resting imposition of criminal sentence explicitly on

70Jay Katz has aptly made this point:
Most persons whom society involuntarily commits are consciously and unconsciously so convinced that no one cares, indeed they look at offers of help
with such suspicion, that a sustained period of exposure to an unaccustomed
world of trust, respect, and care is required in order to attempt to modify these
beliefs. It is possible, without precisely knowing when it is and when it is not, to
change defiant, ignorant, and fearful attitudes about treatment through patient
and persistent efforts in an institutional setting. Behind the conscious refusal of
treatment, other unconscious wishes also operate-to be protected, to be cared
for, to be sustained, to be helped. What weight should be given to these wishes
when they are almost drowned out by words which damn their own self and the
world?
Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. CH. L. REV. 755, 771
(1969).
71 Burt & Morris, supra note 49, at 73. See also Katz, supra note 70, at 773.
72 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1, Comment at 54-56 (Tent. Draft No. 11,

1960).
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a judgment of future dangerousness. Norval Morris, in an important lecture series recently delivered at the University of
Michigan, has argued against this policy essentially on the
ground that our predictive powers for dangerousness are currently seriously inadequate, that significant numbers of "false
positive" predictions will always be unavoidable because of the
inherent difficulty of this predictive enterprise, and that confinement of any person based solely on his categorically statistical
likelihood of future dangerousness is unjust.7 3 In warning of the
social dangers of explicit "dangerousness" confinements for convicted criminals, Morris stated:
[W]e possess an extremely convenient mechanism by
which to conceal from ourselves our critical capacity as
predictors-the mask of overprediction. If in doubt, put
him in or keep him in. Why risk injury or death to
potential innocent victims, particularly since the freedom involved is that of a person who has been convicted of a crime? . . . What is wonderfully convenient
about this overprediction of risk is that the predictor
74
does not know who in particular he needlessly holds.
This critique applies with even greater force to indefinite
civil commitment practices. Even more than for the convicted
criminal, we have multiple social and psychological mechanisms
for averting our eyes from the "mentally ill." Our rationalistic
model of the criminal justice system-that the criminal "could
control himself' and was thus "responsible" for his action and
"deserved punishment"-permits us generally to look more directly at, and speak more plainly to, convicted criminals about
our anger at and fear of them. But our image of mental illness
evokes rage beyond control. The intrapsychic mechanisms by
which we defuse our own rages are insistently called into force
by persons who vividly lack such psychic control mechanisms. By
whatever means, we must put distance between "us" and "them,"
between "ourselves" and the part of us that they represent and
that threatens our self-control. Invocation of civil commitment,
with its forbidding and comforting labels of "psychoses," and its
trappings of psychiatric personnel and therapeutic rhetoric,
13 Morris, The Future of Imprisonment: Toward a Punitive Philosophy, 72 MICH. L. REV.
1161, 1164-73 (1974) (originally a Cooley Lecture, University of Michigan, 1974).
74
1d. 1169.
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helps give us this distance. It helps "us" avert our eyes from
"them" and from the consequences of our aversion to them.
There are social and personal benefits from civil commitment, but they can be assured only by exorcising the dark motives and dire consequences that attend our current uses of this
power. In civil commitment practices, the mutually confusing
and corrupting linked status of "criminal-insane" must be split
apart. Civil commitment can be restricted to the "insane" who
need "treatment" by limiting its application to short term crisis
interventions. For the rest, for those who need something more
and something more distasteful than "treatment," application of
the criminal laws must suffice. It may be that preventive detentions based on dangerousness predictions will come into use in
the general criminal justice system, but the propriety of such
general use can be more clearly appraised if explicit dangerousness confinements are not imposed on the "mentally ill" as such.
In the future, identifiable psychological characteristicssome species of "mental illness" whose identification is peculiarly within psychiatric provinces-may be validated as a prime
predictor of dangerousness. But that validation has not yet
come; objective factors, such as age and past overt conduct, are
the best current predictors, as inadequate as these are.7 5 If a
"mental illness" label in the future becomes an adequate indicator of social danger, there will still be powerful reasons for
confining the application of such predictions to persons already
caught in the ordinary criminal justice system. But today, in the
absence of such validated knowledge, this position, and its concomitant implication for the abolition of indeterminate civil
commitment, is clearly compelling.
C. The Insanity Defense
The case for abolition of the insanity defense has been
powerfully advanced in recent years. The abolitionists have put
forward several basic contentions. First, in practical effect, an
insanity finding is no "defense" because virtually automatic indeterminate confinement follows from it in almost every jurisdiction. 76 Second, the insanity standards however formulated

'5

See note 17 supra. For a persuasive critique of civil commitment confinements, see
Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justificationsfor Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L.
REV. 75 (1968).

'6 For a brief discussion of the disposition of those acquitted by reason of insanity,
see S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 16, at 404-05, 430-43 (app.).
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cannot successfully distinguish among the large numbers of
criminals (particularly violent criminals) suffering from significant psychopathology. Third, if it is unjust to impose stigmatizing blame on a criminal actor motivated by psychopathology
beyond his conscious control, it would seem equally unjust to
impose blame on an actor led to crime by sociological forcesa broken family, racial prejudice, grinding poverty and the like
-equally beyond the actor's choice or control. In terms of the
earlier discussion here, the case for abolition seems unanswerable-the insanity defense does not reliably work to the defendant's advantage though it is touted as an act of social solicitude,
and though "hard core cases" can be distinguished, the differences between most criminals and these "criminal-insane" van77
ish on careful analysis.

But these considerations do not conclude the argument.
Though the defendant may not reliably benefit from availability
of the insanity defense (at least since the death penalty's demise),
there are reasons to believe that the insanity plea serves an important social purpose. Some evidence on this score is suggested
by the enormous volume of academic attention to this issue,
while ignoring the conjunction of the police and mental health
powers with greater practical significance. 78 This scholarly obsession may, of course, be merely symptomatic of general academic
psychopathology. But this obsession suggests something more to
me-that the ethical and psychological issues vividly raised by
the insanity plea are central to this society's view of the function
of its criminal justice system.
Judge Bazelon wrote in Durham, "'Our collective conscience
does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame.'

",79

77For elaboration of these arguments, see Morris, supra note 16; id. 544-47 (appendix summarizing the other major insanity defense abolitionist views in the current literature).
78 In 1967, for example, a national survey of state mental institutions revealed that of
some 11,000 persons involved in the criminal justice system in such institutions, only 409,
or four percent, had been found not guilty by insanity. Slightly more than half of these
11,000 were involved in trial incompetency adjudications and the rest were convicted
criminals transferred from prisons for "mental illness." P. SCHEIDEMANDEL & C. KANNO,
THE MENTALLY ILL OFFENDER 20 (1969). See also Morris, supra note 16, at 519:
Overwhelmingly, criminal matters are disposed of by pleas of guilty and by
bench trials. Only the exceptional case goes to trial by jury. And of these exceptional cases, in only two of every hundred is this [insanity] defense raised. Does
anyone believe that this percentage measures the actual significance of gross
psychopathology to crime?
79 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (quoting Holloway v.
United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945)).
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The British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment stated,
"Views have changed and opinions have differed . . .about the
standards [for insanity] to be applied . . .but the principle has
been accepted without question. '80 That is no reason to continue
unquestioning acceptance. But still, it is an important fact that
the insanity defense has been much explored, its continued existence has recently been much debated, and yet its power to
transfix our imaginations seems unabated. Unlike the other
"criminal-insane" statuses discussed here, the insanity defense
takes place at the center of the ritual of the criminal trial. It
alone purports to bring into focus the grand issues of moral
responsibility underlying the imposition of criminal norms and
punishments. The continued existence of the defense, at least in
its ritual aspects, may be central to preserving the ethical integrity of the criminal justice system, perhaps only in a popular
sense or perhaps in more than that.
This conclusion is difficult to prove and even more difficult
to evaluate. And if the earlier argument here is accepted, that
the burden of proof rests on those who would retain the existing
"criminal-insane" rubrics, this Delphic justification for the insanity defense might not seem adequate to the task. Indeed, it might
be argued from this that abolition of the insanity defense is the
most important step toward achieving the goal proclaimed in the
preceding section of this Article-that the public should be frontally forced to acknowledge that Science has no special claim to
custody or cure of any predesignated subgroup within the criminal population.., but maybe not.
For the trial incompetency and civil commitment statuses, I
have argued the importance of preserving the solicitude provided to the mentally disabled while restricting the impact of
those statuses to guard against their excesses. Perhaps for the
insanity defense it is equally possible to preserve the solace it
offers for mental disabilities-including the disability afflicting
those people who cling to the notion that "insane people" must
not be held "responsible" for "criminal acts"-while combatting
the harm worked by the doctrine's operation. The only aspect of
the insanity defense that appears worth preserving is its courtroom ritualization. Retaining the ritual for its own sake might
be justified by the same reasoning that occasionally moves agnos80 ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,

98 (1953).

1949-53

REPORT,

CMD. No. 8932, at
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tics to attend religious services: to acknowledge strong attachments to the past and to hedge bets for the future. But giving
any dispositive effect to an insanity ruling, outside the trial
drama, creates excessive risks of social harm.
The first small step toward this goal would be to eliminate
indeterminate commitment as a response to a criminal insanity
finding. The premise of such commitment, whether prescribed
by statute as a consequence of this finding, as in many jurisdictions, or accomplished by invoking ordinary civil commitment
procedures after such finding, is that these "criminal-insane"
must be confined until "cured," unlike other convicted criminals
for whom fixed terms are set and who are released whether or
not "cured" of criminality.8 ' Since it cannot be demonstrated
that recidivism is more likely for the criminally insane than for
others who have committed criminal acts, there is no adequate
reason to protect society more rigorously from one group than
from the other. Accordingly, whatever maximum prison term
society has chosen for a given criminal act should limit both
groups' confinement equally.
But imposing the same maximum term gives insufficient
assurance of equal treatment to those found not guilty by insanity. They are still likely to suffer from adverse discrimination in
parole availability, in objective conditions of confinement, and in
social stigma both during and after confinement. Short of
abolishing the criminal insanity defense, there is no way conclusively to assure against these discriminations. It seems possible,
however, that these adverse effects follow not so much from the
criminally insane status as such but rather from the fact of separate institutionalization attaching to that status. Though this
cannot be clearly proven, it must at least be questioned whether
separate institutionalization for these persons serves any important purpose. If none can be identified, that would seem reason
enough to act on the likelihood that the visibility attached to
separate institutionalization would foster any potential for adverse discrimination against the criminally insane.
Separate institutions for the criminally insane have been
considered necessary to assure a "medical-custodial disposition"
rather than a "punitive-correctional disposition" for them. 82 But
in practice this solicitude has clearly proven fictitious. John Doe's
81 See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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testimony, cited earlier, 8 3 that special state institutions for the
"criminal-insane" statuses are 'just nothing but for detention
and to get rid of [them] and, well, a place to stay," generally
holds true. Occasionally state mental institutions convincingly
present aspects of medical-custodial dispositions. But state prisons exhibit those same elements at least as frequently. There is,
in short, nothing in a well-run prison system that bars provision
of therapeutic services fully equalling whatever might be provided in specially identified institutions for the "criminal-insane."
It is, of course, difficult to maintain a supportive, therapeutic
milieu while continually assuring that patients cannot escape, but
prisons and maximum security mental institutions share this
problem equally.
This is not merely a jurisdictional proposition, an argument
that special institutions should be conducted under the aegis of
the state corrections department rather than the mental health
department. It is an argument instead against any clearly identifiable special institution for long term confinements. The projected organization of psychiatric services in the federal prison
system is the model intended here. 84 Basic psychiatric care
should be provided to prisoners who remain in the regular
prison population. Separate psychiatric facilities for prisoners
should be available only for short term response to acute psychotic episodes, providing stabilizing therapies designed to permit rapid return to the general population where psycho- and
chemotherapeutic support could be continued.
Some psychotic prisoners may be so unrestrainedly violent
that separate confinement for long terms is necessary for them.
But all difficult-to-control violent prisoners present the same
confinement problems. On this score, there might be justification for special institutions to hold prisoners who are particularly
violent actors in the prison system. Prison violence is no justification, however, for special institutions to hold "mentally ill" violent prisoners.
The projected federal model suggests that the abolition of
special long term psychiatric confinement institutions is therapeutically feasible. The multiple adverse consequences that fall
83Note 21 supra.
84
See Hearings on Behavior Modification Programs,Federal Bureau of Prisons, Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 46-48 (1974).
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on the "criminal-insane" from their highly visible separate institutionalization demonstrates the imperative justice of this
proposal. It may seem odd to propose retention of the criminal
insanity defense so long as no practical consequences follow successful invocation of that defense. But if the sole justification of
the criminal insanity plea is its ritual function, it should be
cleanly limited to ritual. By this proposal the "criminal-insane"
label would adhere to some prisoners. But common sense and
recent empirical research suggest that the predominant ethos of
the institution would obscure the special labels on a few inmates,
and that institutional staff who are forced to treat these special
status inmates as no different from others would quickly come to
85
see them as no different in fact.
The social dangers of targeting a group of prisoners,
specially decked in the trappings of Science, were discussed
earlier. 86 On this score, retaining the insanity defense is a tolerable social policy only if those labelled insane in a criminal trial
disappear quickly and completely from public view, as such,
following the trial. When the behavioral scientists might later
pursue these targets-as the Detroit psychosurgeon hunted out
the "criminal sexual psychopaths" alone in the Michigan institution-they might be found through record entries, but institutional staff would be hard put to provide testimonials that they
were radically different from others.
D.

"Criminal Sexual Psychopathy," "Defective
Delinquency," and the Like

The case for retaining the insanity defense has been made
only half-heartedly. But no one can have heart for retaining the
other crude depictions of "criminal-insane" statuses created by
relatively more recent legislation, such as "criminal sexual

85 Henry Steadman and Joseph Cocozza have traced the institutional careers of a
group of "criminal-insane" status convicted criminals who were kept beyond their maximum prison sentences in a special institution, most of them for decades, based on
psychiatric estimates of their "mental illness" and "dangerousness." These prisoners were
forced into general civil institutions by the Supreme Court's decision in Baxstrom v.
Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), and although staff there expressed great initial fear, these
inmates were easily assimilated into the civil population. A majority of these transferred
inmates were quickly and successfully released to the community. H. STEADMAN & J.
CocozzA, supra note 15, ch. 6. For suggestion of the proposition that the institutional
setting dictates staff perception of patients' mental health more than patients' individual
characteristics, see Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973).
86 Text accompanying notes 18-48 supra.
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psychopaths" or "defective delinquents. ' s These special depictions, which exist in the statutes of some twenty-eight jurisdictions, are avowedly hybrids--conceptually different both from
the "pure insanity defense" and from "pure criminality. 8 8 Both
conceptually and practically, these depictions are best characterized as pure obscenities, at least in the sense that they are
utterly without redeeming social value.
The mutual corruptions of therapeutic and community
safety motives are sharply etched by these statutes. Under them,
courts are permitted to impose indeterminate confinement terms
no matter what maximum term the criminal offense charged
might carry. The applicability of these statutes are so vaguely
open-ended that almost any "socially undesirable" person can be
reached. Consider, for example, the reach of the Maryland act's
definition of a "defective delinquent":
[A]n individual who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated anti-social or criminal behavior, evidences a propensity toward criminal activity and who is
found to have either such intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance, or both, as to clearly demonstrate an
actual danger to society so as to require . . .confinement
and treatment ....89
The link between "danger" and "require[d] ...confinement and
treatment," triggered by an utterly plastic conception of "intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance," is rarely so blatant in
these statutes, but this is always the underlying architecture of
them.
Implementation of the Maryland statute illustrates a further
problem with these "criminal-insane" statuses, considered earlier: the dangers of special institutionalization. Persons caught in
the "defective delinquency" net in Maryland are sent to a special
institution for "defective delinquents" at Patuxent. The avowed
intent for the creation of this institution was to concentrate treatment resources in one place for this group thtt might uniquely
benefit from those resources. In practice, Patuxent has been
more successful in attracting funds and credentialled personnel
87The case for abolition of these special statuses has been compellingly drawn in S.
BRAKEL
88 & R. ROCK, supra note 16, at 341-75.
Id.341-43.
89MD. ANN. CODE, art. 31B, § 5 (1971) (emphasis added).

1974]

THE PERILS OF THE "CRIMINAL-INSANE"

than most state institutions designed to serve the "criminalinsane" statuses. 90 But this very success has created special problems for its inmates. The expenditures per capita at Patuxent are
markedly higher than in ordinary correctional institutions, and
there is enormous consequent pressure-rising to crescendoes
annually before the legislative appropriations committees-to
justify this special expenditure.
The Patuxent administrators must claim much more "success" than ordinary prison administrators and those claims have
been grandiosely paraded. Patuxent has put forward claims
that-unique among correctional institutions in Maryland and,
indeed, in the world-persons who have completed their
correctional-therapeutic regime have had only an eight percent
rate of recidivism. 9 ' Patuxent apparently achieved this happy
result by releasing almost no one. This does not mean that these
few alone are released from Patuxent, but rather that the inmates have maintained a constant flurry of litigation so that in
practice state and federal judges have offered the principal route
out of the institution. With their more troublesome inmates thus
taken from them, the Patuxent scientists have ungenerously
touted their own rehabilitative successes in comparison to the
92
subsequent recidivist careers of the judicially released inmates.
One large embarrassment does, however, shine through the
glowing reports of success at Patuxent. Though those who have
completed their therapeutic program are purportedly more
law-abiding than others, the published data nowhere describe
the detailed content of that program. If Patuxent alone has
found the correctional therapist's long-sought alchemy that turns
mad dogs into lambs, it is at least churlish of the institution to
withhold that potion from the rest of us. The chief psychologist
90 See Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 53, 60-61, 221 A.2d
397, 419-23, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 940 (1966) (upholding the constitutionality of
Patuxent's statute and operations).
91 See id. at 63, 221 A.2d at 425 (app. A).
92 According to the Patuxent claims, id., in the first ten years of its operations, only
155 (or 27%)of its 581 committed inmates were released. Of this 155, only 26 (or 4.5% of
all committed inmates) were released at the recommendation of Patuxent staff; of those,
only two (or 8%) were subsequently apprehended for "violations." Of the other 129
inmates, released by the courts without Patuxent recommendations, 62 (or 48%) were
subsequent "violators." These statistics give no indication of any differences between the
court- and institution-released inmates-for example, length of confinement, age at release, seriousness of original offense or subsequent "violation." Further, the accuracy of
these statistics is called into question in Schreiber, Indeterminate Therapeutic Incarceration
of Dangerous Criminals, 56 VA. L. REv. 602, 619, 627 (1970).
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at Patuxent has publicly described the content of the therapeutic program as "eclectic," dependent on different treatment
strategies pursued by separate "teams" within the institution.93
The program, that is, is the classically inscrutable black box from
which nonviolence is purported to emerge. These claims would
be merely silly if the prolonged confinement of persons did not
result from them and if Patuxent's touted success did not tempt
other states to emulate its "program."
Patuxent, and the Maryland defective delinquency statute,
provide an additional illustration of the urgent need to insulate
the criminal justice system from scientific hucksterism, and to
free prisoners from formal labels and institutions that provoke
the grandiosity of the old and new behavioral technologists.
E. Prisoners Found "'MentallyIll"
It may seem odd that special mention must be made of the
disposition of convicted criminals who, during their prison term,
are found "mentally ill." But ironies abound in the formalistic
category- and institution-ridden way this society responds to the
"criminal-insane." In a world of common sense,
it would appear that the problem of mental disability
developed or detected in prison is one of the prisoner's
trying to assert his disability and obtain transfer to a
treatment-oriented institution. As it turns out, however,
the thrust of the problem is usually the reverse: it is the
prison authorities who seek to effectuate a transfer, and
94
the prisoner who resists it.
This is testimony again that our benevolence toward the
"criminal-insane" masks other motives, most starkly visible to the
objects of our care.
Here, as in the other "criminal-insane" statuses discussed,
the solution seems clear. Various forms of well-accepted psychotherapies should be provided to mentally ill prisoners in ways
that do not demarcate them dramatically apart from other prisoners. This solution runs counter to a long reformist tradition
93Statement by Dr. Arthur Kandel at a conference sponsored by the Hastings Institute for Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences, New York City, Dec. 8, 1973. For a

discussion by the director of Patuxent and several associates, see Boslow, Rosenthal &
Gliedman, The Maryland Defective Delinquency Law: Psychiatric Implicationsfor the Treatment
of Antisocial Disorders under the Law, 10 BRIT.J. DELINQUENCY 5 (1959).
94S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 16, at 407.
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insisting that only "hospitals" and not "prisons" could offer help
to the mentally ill. But "hospitals" for the criminally insane have
not met this prescription. Further, it would solve nothing to
confine mentally ill prisoners in civil mental hospitals with the
hope that they would be treated indistinguishably from all patients. In general civil hospitals, mentally ill prisoners would suffer the same fate that has afflicted persons committed to civil
hospitals for trial incompetency with outstanding criminal
indictments.9 5 Because of their peculiar involvement with the
criminal justice system, the hospital authorities would be sensitive to public fear of these patients in particular and, among
other adverse effects, would see special need to ensure against
their escape and to hold them for long terms.9 6 Mentally ill prisoners can be protected from seriously adverse discriminations
only by keeping in high visibility the proposition that they are
not very much different from all prisoners.
III.

THE BURDEN ON THE COURTS

It may be that these proposed reformations of the
"criminal-insane" statuses would not have much practical impact.
Our social commitment to special handling of people with
"dangerous mental illnesses" may be so deep-rooted that other
guises will be found for this purpose. The pressures for using
novel biotechnologies for social control may be so compelling
that purging the temptations offered by the science-sounding
labels of the "criminal-insane" will provide only momentary diversion before the technologists find new targets inside correctional institutions. But the magnitude of the current wrongs and
the future social harms that appear linked to these reified
''criminal-insane" statuses are sufficient to call into doubt the
case for their continued existence, and the arguments for retaining these statuses intact are not strong enough to overcome this
doubt. Once the burden of proof has been placed on justifying
the current existence of these statuses, the burden cannot be
adequately discharged.
But what, then, is the proper role of the courts in all this?
The future directions of the "criminal-insane" statuses have been
95 See text accompanying notes 49-67 supra.
96 If long term civil commitment is abolished, as proposed in text accompanying
notps 68-75 supra, the special status and "dangerousness" of these prisoners would be
even more starkly apparent.
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discussed thus far apparently at large, as matters of social policy.
But the normative proposition underlying all of this discussion is
quite familiar to the courts: it is the norm of equal protection of
the laws. In each of the "criminal-insane" statuses, our law currently designates a group from among the criminal population
for different treatment. The question for equal protection
analysis is whether the differences between these designated
groups are sufficient to warrant the differential consequences
following from that categorization.
In view of the seriously adverse consequences, both to the
individuals labeled and to society generally, of the "criminalinsane" statuses, a court could justifiably invalidate them for the
reasons and in the manner proposed in the preceding discussion. I am not here necessarily suggesting that "criminal-insane"
is a suspect categorization. I am suggesting that equal protection analysis generally demands some greater persuasiveness
for legislative categorization if significant adverse individual
and social consequences attach to that categorization. 97 On this
score, the "criminal-insane" statuses cannot pass muster.
The Supreme Court has already pointed in this direction in
its few considerations of the "criminal-insane" statuses. In Baxstrom v. Herold,98 the Court invalidated on equal protection
grounds a statute providing that prisoners found "mentally ill"
could be confined in an institution for the criminally insane at
the end of their prison term. This statute employed substantive
standards and procedures less rigorous than those required for
ordinary civil commitments. The Court's result was relatively
easy to reach because there seems little reason to treat a mentally
ill former prisoner different from any other mentally ill person.
There are some arguable differences-for example, prisoners
even at the end of their terms might generally be presumed
more "dangerous" than others-but the Court gave short shrift
to the possible differences. 9 9
More recently the Court has scrutinized aspects of other
"criminal-insane" statuses, in one case invalidating indeterminate

"

See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-24 (1972). See generally Developments in the
Law--Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
98 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
99Id. at 114-15.
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commitment based solely on trial incompetency 0 0 and in two
other cases calling into question statutes which converted fixed
term prison sentences into indeterminate commitments based
on "sex deviancy" or "defective delinquency" mental illness
labellings. 1' 1 In all of these cases, as in Baxstrom, the Court ruled
that equal protection required application of ordinary civil
commitment standards and procedures to justify special state
power on grounds of mental illness.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit characterized
the theme of these cases in this way: "[W]e cannot tolerate two
classes of insane persons-criminal and non-criminal-when we
are asked to examine commitment procedures available to
both."' 0 2 But insisting on comparability between the "criminalinsane" and the "noncriminal-insane" is neither a necessary nor a
helpful way to apply equal protection analysis. There is in fact
one adequate difference between these two groups. One group
has committed criminal offenses, the other has not. Different
quanta of state power over each group should justifiably follow
from that difference.
The absence of any criminal conviction for the "noncriminal-insane" is the central reason, as a matter of constitutional
law, for invalidating long term or indeterminate civil commitment of the "dangerous mentally ill." The criminal law, hedged
round with elaborate constitutional protections, should be the
basic mechanism for community protection. For the reasons
discussed earlier, it is unfair and socially dangerous to proliferate other community protection mechanisms based solely on the
"mental illness" of the "dangerous person" unless those mech0
1"
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 7-15 (1972).
101In Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972), the maximum sentence for petitioner's
crime had expired and he was confined under the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act "for a
potentially indefinite period of time," id. at 506. The lower court had dismissed
petitioner's equal protection claim without a hearing, and the Supreme Court remanded,
virtually directing that the statute be overturned. In McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972), petitioner's criminal sentence had also expired but he
was confined at Patuxent for assessment as a possible "defective delinquent" under the
state statute. See text accompanying notes 87-93 supra. Apparently in order to forestall
the doctors from converting his fixed term sentence into indeterminate commitment,
petitioner had simply refused to talk to the staff at Patuxent. Undaunted, the state contended that petitioner "may be confined indefinitely until he cooperates and the institution has succeeded in making its evaluation." 407 U.S. at 246. The Court resolved this
mad standoff by invalidating petitioner's confinement.
102 United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1081 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 847 (1969).
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anisms are sharply and reliably different in purpose and effect
from the criminal law. 10 3 Imposing prolonged involuntary incarceration on "mentally ill, dangerous" people is not different
enough from the purposes and effect of the criminal law.
To claim, as a matter of equal protection, that the
"criminal-insane" and the "noncriminal-insane" must be given
similar treatment obscures this important proposition. In fact,
several courts have been misled by this equal protection analysis
into holding that persons found not guilty by insanity can be
confined only under generally applicable state civil commitment laws.' 0 4 These holdings are consistent with the internal
logic of the insanity defense-that "mental illness" transforms
and exculpates "criminal acts." Requiring that these defendants
be confined, if at all, through civil commitment modalities is
not an illogical application of equal protection analysis. But
these holdings illustrate the intrinsic illogic of the insanity defense itself in its pretense that ordinary community protective
purposes of the criminal law have no easily justifiable application to "mentally ill criminals." In fact, no defendant should
plead or be found not guilty by insanity unless he has committed
a serious antisocial act. Extended confinement of such defendants in many cases is clearly appropriate for community protective purposes. But insisting that such defendants are no different from any civilly committable person creates a powerful,
though erroneous, argument for retaining the possibility of
prolonged confinement for everyone subject to civil commitment. "If equal protection analysis requires equal treatment for
the 'insane' and the 'criminally insane,' then states may well be
drawn to greater abuse of the mad in order to be sure of ensnaring the bad."'1 5 These holdings obstruct the centrally
important goal of abolishing long term or indefinite civil commitment.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has applied
this same unhelpful equal protection analysis to require application of ordinary civil commitment laws to prisoners found "mentally ill" while serving criminal sentences and transferred to state
103See text accompanying notes 68-75 supra; compare Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144 (1963).
104 Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27,
224 N.E.2d 87, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1966).
15 Burt & Morris, supra note 49, at 70.
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mental institutions. 10 6 The court stated ample grounds for con-

cern about the adverse impact of transfer from prison to mental
institution:
[Transfer n]ot only ...

effectively eliminate[d] the pos-

sibility of [the prisoner's] parole, but it significantly
increased the restraints upon him, exposed him to extraordinary hardships, and caused him to suffer indignities, frustrations and dangers, both physical and
psychological, he would not be required to endure in a
typical prison setting. 107
But the remedy chosen by that court-application of openended ordinary civil commitment laws as the prelude to
transfer-is not at all responsive to this problem. This court in
effect said, "Special procedures are necessary to justify heaping
these adverse consequences on any criminal who is found insane." Why is there any justification in making life so much more
difficult for any criminal simply because he is found insane? The
court should rather have ruled out the possibility of this transfer,
of this stigmatizing separation in the service of Science. The
Second Circuit should not have sought equality between the
"criminal-insane" and "noncriminal insane." It should have insisted on equal treatment of the criminal and the "criminalinsane."
The Supreme Court cases in this area do not necessarily
force equal protection analysis into this misleading mold.
Baxstrom and its successor cases in the Court,108 with one exception, deal with the fate of convicted criminals confined for "mental illness" beyond the term of their criminal sentences. In these
cases the Court, in effect, ruled that state power to confine these
persons had ended and, if they were to be confined further, the
justification must be found in laws governing all free persons
-either civil commitment or a new criminal charge. It is not
helpful to analyze these cases as requiring equal treatment between a group of "criminals" and others. There were no "criminals" involved in these cases, only former criminals whose sentences had expired. The Court in effect held that a person's
106United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 107
847 (1969).
Id. at 1078.
108See notes 100 & 101 supra.
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prior criminality was not an adequate reason for giving the state
'0 9
incremental authority to confine him for "mental illness."'
The most important post-Baxstrom case did not deal with
former criminals.Jackson v. Indiana" ° considered the permissible
reach of state power over persons accused of criminal conduct
and found incompetent to stand trial.Jackson,even more than its
predecessor cases, leads toward rejection of state powers based
specially on a conjunction of criminal law involvement and mental disability. For incompetent defendants, the Court authorized
only short term confinement needed to assure that the defendant might go to trial. This special power over a mentally disabled defendant closely resembles traditional state power to confine criminal defendants generally-that is, power to deny bail,
or set highly restrictive bail, to assure the defendant's trial
availability."' But beyond short term confinement, the Jackson
Court ruled that confinement based on mental illness alone
2
could be justified only through civil commitment proceedings."
The Court concluded that the incompetent defendant could not
be subjected to prolonged confinement based on the outstanding
charge. The Court in effect held that the criminal law permits
such confinement only after trial and conviction.
Jackson thus implicitly holds that a mentally ill defendant can
be confined only for the same reasons that the state holds either
all criminal defendants or all mentally ill persons. The Court
excluded any incremental state authority based on the conjunction of "criminality" and "mental illness" presented by mentally
incompetent defendants. Jackson asked not only, why should this
suspected criminal be treated differently from any other mentally ill person? Jackson also asked, why should this suspected
criminal be treated any differently from any other such suspect
simply because of his mental illness? This kind of equal protec109 In Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972), for example, the Court's equal protection analysis required that if a state wants to commit all "peeping toms" to potentially
indefinite incarceration, it may directly and generally mandate such incarceration as a
possible punishment for that offense. The state cannot, however, provide that the offense shall be punishable by a one year maximum incarceration term except that any
such offender who suffers from "mental... deficiency, disorder or abnormality" shall be
subject to indefinite incarceration beyond that term. 405 U.S. at 506-07. This disadvantageous conjunction of "criminality" with "mental illness" was precisely the flaw of the
Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act.

406 U.S. 715 (1972).
11 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
10

112

406 U.S. at 730.
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tion analysis-requiring clear justification of different treatment
based on mental illness among those subject to criminal law
-undercuts
the continued existence of all of the special
''criminal-insane" statuses discussed here.
This equal protection analysis does not sit sympathetically
with those cases positing a constitutional "right to treatment" for
persons caught in the "criminal-insane" statuses. 113 There are, of
course, considerable practical obstacles that encumber judicial
efforts to ensure that state resources will match the therapeutic
promises held out by those statuses." 4 But the central obstacle is
in the promise itself, in the very existence of these statuses." 5
The future task for judicial intervention is not to ensure that the
therapeutic promise is kept. It is rather to ensure that this society
no longer holds out the chimerical and socially dangerous promises offered by the "criminal-insane" statuses.
Judge Bazelon warned of the "perils of wizardry" in his
recent address to the American Psychiatric Association. He invoked the story of Oz to make this cautionary point:
Dorothy and her companions were none the worse for
having discovered at the end of the yellow brick road
that the "wizard had no magic." In fact, they gained
strength once reliance on the wizard was at an end. But
what if the scenario were changed? What if the wizard
really possessed wizardry-his trunk now laden with
bio-behavioral therapies? How would he use these
skills? I can conjure up one version for you! The lion
could be lobotomized; the tinman could be tranquilized
113E.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Nason v. Superintendent
of Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968).
114 See Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CH. L. REv. 742 (1969);
Halpern, A PracticingLawyer Views the Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 782 (1969).
11S
Judicial "rights to treatment" have recently been bestowed on other objects of this
society's ambivalent concern-mentally retarded children (Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 373, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972)) and 'juvenile delinquents" (Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F.
Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)). As with the "criminal-insane," there is considerable danger
that this judicial posture will only validate the worst aspect of our treatment of these
children: long term, socially isolated institutionalization. See Burt, Beyond the Right to
Treatment: Strategiesfor Judicial Action to Aid the Retarded, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED
CITIZEN AND THE LAW (M. Kindred ed. forthcoming). Compare the fate of the "treatment
rights" sought by litigation at Patuxent, the Maryland "defective delinquents" institution,
which has led-thus far, at least-only to general judicial validation of practices there. Sas
v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964); Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels,
243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397, cert. denied, 385 U.S 940 (1966); Tippett v. Maryland, 436
F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed sub nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Crim. Ct., 407
U.S. 355 (1972). See text accompanying notes 87-93 supra.
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and the scarecrow could be "therapized" with operant
conditioning. All would be done by the wizard in the
service of Emerald City. The cure in this situation may
well be worse than the "disease!" Should the admonition
116
be: "Fear-not follow-the yellow brick road?"
If these perils lie ahead at the end of this road, we should
think again about the path already traversed. Judge Bazelon has
more than any other jurist walked this road with his eyes open.
What he has seen, and what he tells us, should now lead us to
retrace our steps.
116

"Wizardry," supra note 4, at 19.

